Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 55

Issue 1

Article 8

1966

Kentucky Adopts the Positional Risk Doctrine: Chance for a New
Approach
James T. Waitman
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Waitman, James T. (1966) "Kentucky Adopts the Positional Risk Doctrine: Chance for a New Approach,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 55: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol55/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55,

KENTUCKY ADOPTS THE POSITIONAL RISK DOCTRINE:
CHANCE FOR A NEW APPROACH
I. INTRODUCrION
Since the inception of workmen's compensation legislation, courts
have had difficulty with the common provision that an injury, to be
compensable, must arise out of the victim's employment.' Attempts at
interpretation and application of this requirement have produced three
major judicial theories-the peculiar or increased risk doctrine, the
actual risk doctrine, and the positional risk doctrine.
The best description of these approaches is found in Larson,
Workmen's Compensation,2 the definitive treatise on workmen's
compensation law. According to Larson, compensation is awarded
under the peculiar or increased risk doctrine
only when [the injury] arises out of a hazard peculiar or increased by
that employment, and not common to people generally. The doctrine in
practice has produced many exclusions which are difficult to reconcile
with the purposes of compensation legislation, most conspicuously in the
street risk cases (e.g., injuries to solicitors due to normal traffic hazards)
3
and cases of injury by lightning, freezing, sunstroke and the like.

Larson treats the actual risk doctrine as follows:
Under this doctrine, a substantial number of courts are saying, "We
do not care whether this risk was also common to the public, if in
fact it was a risk of this employment." It is a more defensible rule than
the peculiar or increased risk doctrine, since there is no real statutory
basis for insisting upon a peculiar or increased risk, as long as the employment subjected claimant to the actual risk that injured him. One
effect is to permit recoveries in most 4street risk cases and in a much
greater proportion of act-of-God cases.

Larson then describes the positional risk doctrine:
An injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred
but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment
placed claimant in the position where he was injured. . . . This theory
supports compensation . . . in cases of stray bullets, roving lunatics,

and other situations in which the only connection of the employment with the injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the
particular place at the particular time when he was injured by some
neutral force. ....
5

1 See Ky.

REV. STAT.

ch. 342, § 342.005 (1942), for the Kentucky provision.

(1952).
3 Id. § 6.20. Street risks include all perils normally associated with the street.
2 LARSON, WORKMIEN'S COMPENSATION

The "street risk doctrine" arose as an exception to the peculiar or increased risk
doctrine. Under the street risk doctrine, street injuries to workers whose employments necessitate their working in the streets are compensated, even though the
public at large is subjected to the same hazards.
4Id. § 6.30.
5 Id. § 6.40. It might be well to point out here that, when applied to situa(Continued on next page)
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By way of example, when a carpenter cuts himself with a saw,
compensation is awarded under all three of the above theories, since
his injury is clearly caused by his employment. On the other hand,
if he dies of food poisoning from the breakfast his wife prepared for
him at home, his death is not compensable, since it arises out of his
personal life only.
But what if our carpenter runs out of nails, goes across the street
to buy some more, and is struck by a car on the way back? Or what
if, after he returns to work, he is killed by a bolt of lightning? These
are examples of "neutral risks," that is, risks "neither personal to the
claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment." 6 It is in the
area of neutral risks that courts have found it most difficult to determine whether an injury arose out of the employment.
As Larson points out, application of the peculiar or increased
risk doctrine to neutral risk cases often produces results which seem
arbitrary and unfair. The actual risk approach has also proved unsatisfactory. However, the key to an effective solution of the problem
may lie in a well-considered use of the positional risk doctrine.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky recently adopted the positional
risk doctrine,1 thereby opening the door to the development of a new
approach to the entire neutral risk problem. Kentucky, largely freed
from the restrictions of precedent, now has the opportunity of applying
its new rule to neutral risks in such a way as to overcome many of the
difficulties which have so long plagued the courts.
The purpose of this Note is to suggest a fresh attack on the neutral
risk problem, including a re-definition of the word "neutral." First,
however, it will be necessary to examine the present status of the
positional risk doctrine in Kentucky law.
IL. THE

PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

Let us begin with a detailed consideration of Corken v. Corken
Steel Prods., Inc.,8 the case in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals
renounced its previous stand and adopted the positional risk doctrine.
(Footnote continued from preceding pagei

tions in which the injury has no connection with the non-employment life of the
employee, and when its only connection with the employer or the employment is
that the employment put the employee at the time and place where harm struck,
the actual risk doctrine should be sufficient to produce recovery. This is so because, in such situations, the physical position of the employee is of so great an

importance that it is thought of as being itself an active cause of the injury, whereas generally one's physical e.xistence and position is taken for granted and is considered
too passive a thing to be treated as part of the chain of causation.
6
LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 6.40.

7 Corken v. Corken Steel Prods., Inc., 885 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965).
8885 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965).
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Irvin Corken, Jr., was employed by the defendant corporation as a
salesman. In November, 1961, while getting into his car on his way
to call on custoniers, "he was deliberately shot and killed by a
stranger acting without provocation or discernible reason of any kind,
evidently a madman."" The Workmen's Compensation Board denied
a claim for compensation by Corken's dependents on the ground that
the accident did not arise out of the employment. The circuit court
affirmed.
The Court of Appeals reversed, saying,
We accept the view that causal connection is sufficient if the exposure
results from the employment.... Corken's employment was the reason for
his presence at what turned out to be a place of danger, and except for
his presence there he would not have been killed. Hence it is our opinion
that his death arose out of the employment.10
The Court then overruled the case of Lexington Ry. Sys. v. True,1
a Kentucky precedent closely in point, quarreling with its requirement of foreseeabiity. Corken reads as follows:
The theory that an injury must be incidental, or the hazard peculiar,
to the nature of the employment is fundamentally indistinguishable from
the principle of proximate cause, or foreseeability.
The True opinion,
for example, equates causation with 'likelihood." 12
The Corken Court also overruled all "other cases [turning upon] ...
the principle that the injury must result from a risk peculiar to the
work."13
Let us examine True in more detail. There, a street car employee,
driving his bus along a city street, was shot by a boy who was carelessly firing a rifle at birds and other objects. The Workmen's
Compensation Board denied the widow's claim for compensation. The
circuit court reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
the circuit court, deciding the case on the narrow ground that the risk
of being accidentally shot by a boy with a rifle is greater in the
country than on city streets. Thus, it reasoned, the risk was not a
street risk, and the street risk doctrine was inapplicable. Therefore,
the injury did not arise out of the employment.
What is the significance of True's being overruled? It is closely in
point with Corken, and it was necessary for it to be treated there.
However, it might have been distinguished on the facts. It might
simply have been criticized; that the risk of being struck by a stray
9Ibid.

10 Id. at 950.
11276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (1939).

885 S.W.2d 949, 950.
1l Id. at n.1.
12

1966]

NomE

bullet is indeed a street risk is easily argued. Or the Court might
have overruled True and gone no further. But the Corken opinion.
does go further; it seemingly rejects the peculiar or increased risk
doctrine altogether, and it does so in language which, on its face,
would ordinarily connote full acceptance of the doctrine of positional
risk.
Larson is the first supporting authority cited in Corken. The Court
refers to section 10.12, which carries the title "Stray bullets as positional risks." There Larson discusses injuries from bullets and other
flying objects and argues that to apply the positional risk doctrine is
sound in such situations.
Corken also relies on three cases from sister jurisdictions. In the
first, Industrial Indem. Co.- v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,14 a waitress
was struck by a stray bullet fired at a customer by his irate wife.
Compensation was awarded on the basis of the positional risk theory.
In the second case, Gargiulo v. Gargiulo,15 an employee suffered
an eye injury when a boy standing on adjacent property accidentally
shot him with an arrow. The New Jersey court found that the incident satisfied the test that, for recovery to be had, the employment
must have been a contributing cause of the accident or the accident
must have been due to a risk reasonably incident to the employment.
The court said, "But for the compliance with his allotted work
directive requiring his presence at the particular time and place in
question, the injury would not have been inflicted."'"
Lastly, In re Baran's Case17 involved the shooting of an employee by a boy with a. rifle. Said the Massachusetts court, "The
employment brought the employee in contact with the risk of being
shot by the particular bullet which struck him."18 Recovery was allowed. This and the other two cases are also discussed in Larson,
section 10.12.
The three cases cited in Corken, then, deal only with injuries accidentally caused by strangers discharging weapons. The section of
Larson referred to considers various flying objects originating from
sources connected with neither the employer nor the employee.
Indus-trial Indemnity and Gargiulo clearly adopt the positional risk
doctrine, while Baran speaks more in terms of actual risk. Although it
is often difficult to be certain, if it is correct to say that Baran is an
14 97 Cal. App. 804, 214 P.2d 41 (1950). Commented upon, 5 NACCA L.J.
56 (1950), with some discussion of positional risk.
'r 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
16 Id., 97 A.2d at 596.
17336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957).
Is Id., 145 N.E.2d at 727.
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actual risk case, it is a good example of how recovery can be reached
in such situations without the necessity of employing the positional
risk doctrine.
The Corken opinion, then, does not seem to limit the possibilities
for the future application of the doctrine it announced. The doctrine
is stated in terms broad enough to include all neutral risks. Yet the
cases referred to, which involve two stray bullets and one arrow,
present a narrow picture. If the Court meant to indicate that, in the
future, the logic of Corken would be used in all neutral cases, why
did it confine its case references to such a limited area? If it meant to
make a narrow holding, and had in mind no purpose to extend the
rule to analogous situations, why did it employ the broad, unqualified
expressions that are found in the opinion? The language directs us
neither one way nor the other. One is left with the impression that
this question was intentionally left open, awaiting further persuasion.
To what extent has the Corken rule been limited by subsequent
decisions? It has been cited in but two cases. The first of these is
Black v. Tichenor.1 9 Tichenor was injured in an automobile accident
while riding with Black, his fellow employee. The mishap occurred one
Sunday night on route to a nearby town where they were to commence their work duties Monday morning. Their employment as
auditors necessitated their making the trip.
Tichenor sued Black for negligence and received a favorable
verdict. Black appealed on the grounds that, since the injury was
sustained in the course of and arose out of their employment, a suit
for negligence could not be maintained against him, a fellow employee. 20 The Court held, inter alia, that the injury arose out of the
employment. The Corken rule was applied, even though the same result could probably have been reached on these facts by using the increased risk doctrine. Black can therefore serve as precedent for applying the positional risk doctrine to street risks.
The other case, just handed down, is Gordon v. Jefferson County
Fiscal Court.21 A watchman in a garage was killed when his car fell
onto him from a grease rack. The Court distinguished Corken and
denied the claim. Since there was no neutral risk in Gordon, not to
apply Corken was correct, as will be argued subsequently. However,
there is a suggestion in Gordon that the fact that Corken used his
automobile in his work was important to the outcome of his case.
19 396 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1965).
20 See Miller v. Scott, 339 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1960).
21 403 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. 1966).
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Since Corken's car had nothing to do with his death, this position
seems untenable. It is apparently no more than careless dictum. Gordon
stands for the proposition that the claimant must carry the burden of
proving that the injury arose out of the employment, despite the
adoption of the positional risk theory.
Both the language in Corken and the holding in Black indicate
that Corken will not be restricted to its peculiar facts; it will at least
be applied to all street risk cases. Will it be extended to cover all
neutral risks? Will it be extended to all risks, including personal ones,
thereby eliminating the "arising out of" requirement althogether?
Taking the latter possibility first, there is perhaps some danger
that Corken will be applied to cases involving personal risks. To do so
would be to step into the trap inherent in the language of the positional risk theory. For instance, it might be said of a man murdered
by his wife's paramour while at work that "his employment was the
reason for his presence at what turned out to be a place of danger,
22
and except for his presence there he would not have been killed,"

without any showing that the employment made the victim more
vulnerable to his aggressor. This result seems contrary to both the
letter and spirit of the requirement that the injury arise out of the
employment. It must be kept in mind that the positional risk doctrine
developed in relation to neutral risk cases only. Alone, it is hardly an
adequate test of the central question to be decided-whether or not
the risk of the injury suffered was a personal one, to be borne by the
employee-and it should not be used as such. Notice, however, that
there is less danger in the Kentucky statement of the doctrine than in
the broader "An injury arises out of the employment if it would not
have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of
the employment placed claimant in the position where he was injured."23 Further, the result in the Gordon case, discussed above, may
be authority for not applying the Corken doctrine to cases in which
there is a personal risk, but the facts of Gordon being less than clear,
that case is of doubtful value as precedent.
Whatever the situation regarding the personal risk problem, the
Court of Appeals has yet to apply the positional risk doctrine to
neutral risks in any conclusive manner. This area, the most troublesome, was impliedly reopened by the Corken opinion and is open still.
Kentucky is thus presented with the opportunity of solving the neutral
risk problems which have been so vexing to state courts in the past.
22 385 S.W.2d 948, 950.
2 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 6.40.
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III. SUGGESTIONS CONCENING

NEUTRAL

RISKS

Larson describes a neutral risk as one which is "neither personal to
the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment." 24 This
definition (and perhaps it is not even intended as a definition) is not
satisfactory. When the result of a case depends upon whether there is
a causal connection between the injury and the employment, compensation is always awarded when the risk seems "distinctly associated
with the employment." It is never awarded when the risk appears to be
personal. This is the matter to be determined. The Larson formulation
provides no solution; it begs the question. In Larson, the category of
neutral risk includes all cases which are doubtful, and it becomes a
catch-all for miscellaneous uncertainties.
"Neutral" can be used to greater advantage. In any case in which
an injury is caused in part by some force or occurrence external to the
person injured (diseases are thus excluded), two factors may be isolated, the person and the external force. Thus, the following definition
is suggested. When it is clear that the causes of the external force are
in no significant way connected with either the employment or the
personal life of the victim, the risk of being injured by that force may
be said to be truly neutral.Thus, acts of God, most street risk incidents
and some assaults, among others, are neutral.
"Neutral" under this definition becomes a third category, easily
distinguishable from both "personal" and "employment-connected."
The latter two categories tend to shade into one another in close cases,
as always, but this tendency is the less for having excluded neutral
cases from the spectrum. The category of neutral is kept distinct with
little difficulty.
Consider some examples. Applying the Larson definition to the
True case, was the risk of being accidentally shot by a boy with a
rifle "neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with
the employment"? The answer is uncertain. It is arguable that it was
distinctly associated with the employment by virtue of its being a
street risk. On the other hand, strained reasoning can result in the
conclusion that the risk was personal, as evidenced by the opinion.
Use of the suggested definition would have eliminated the necessity
for the tenuous argument found in True. Thinking of "neutral risk" as
a separate category clarifies matters. True's death was caused by the
concurrence of two factors, his position in place and time, and the
boy's careless ignition of the rifle. The latter factor is the "external
force or occurrence." It is clear that the causes of the boy's actions
24

Ibid.

NoTES
were in no way connected either with True's employment or with
his personal life. That the risk of the injury suffered was a neutral one
is obvious when the suggested definition is employed, but the question
is clouded under Larson's approach.
25
Another example is the case of Fuqua 1. Dep't of Highways.
Fuqua was clearing brush on a highway right of way. When a sudden storm broke, he was told to seek shelter, and he took refuge in a
nearby garage. He was killed by a bolt of lightning which struck the
garage. To determine whether or not the risk of being struck by
lightning in this situation was neutral, Larson would ask two questions: "Was the risk personal?" "Was the risk distinctly associated with
the employment?" It might be argued that the risk was distinctly associated with the employment in that Fuqua's work made him more
vulnerable to the elements. There is no confusion under the proposed
definition: the cause of the lightning clearly had no connection either
with Fuqua or with his cutting brush.
On the other hand, the Gordon case, discussed above, does not
involve a neutral risk by the suggested approach. There was no showing, nor any reason to suspect, that Gordon's being crushed by his
car was neither personal nor employment-connected. Indeed, the injury seems to have been caused either by personal activities or by
employment activities although by which is not altogether clear. Again,
the existing test for "neutral" only muddies the water. However, under
the proposed test, it is clear at the outset that no neutral risk was
involved, making a consideration of that problem unneccessary.
Gordon presents a good example of how confusion can be avoided
by making "neutral" a distinct category.
IV. CONCLUSION
Equipped with a better understanding of what is involved when
we say "neutral risk," we may now consider the desirability of applying
the positional risk doctrine found in Corken in all neutral risk cases.
It may be observed at the outset that to do so would be to increase
the percentage of awards; nevertheless, this alternative appears better
commended by reason.
There are convincing reasons for applying Corken to all neutral
risks, using "neutral" in the sense suggested above. In the first place,
this approach is the most logical and straightforward way of carrying
out the mandates of the statute. The "arising out of and in the course
of" requirement has one of two purposes. Either it was intended to
25292 Ky. 783, 168 S.W.2d 39 (1943).
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limit compensation to injuries clearly caused by the employment, or
it was designed to provide awards in all cases except those in which
the injury stemmed from non-employment causes. Where the emphasis
is placed is determinative of the outcome of neutral risk cases. The injunction that the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act 26 "shall be
liberally construed on questions of law, as distinguished from evidence,' 2 7 which has been interpreted to mean that doubts as to the
meaning of the law must be resolved in favor of the claimant,2 4
answers the question. Injuries from neutral risks are not personal, by
any definition. The statute directs, then, that they should be compensated.
Furthermore, the often-repeated purpose of workmen's compensation legislation is to place the burden of the disabled worker's support on the employer or the employer's customers, rather than the
general public. It is commonly agreed that this result is reasonable if,
and only if, the employment was in some way responsible for the disabling injury. As argued above, when dealing with neutral risks, the
physical position of the employee is itself so significant a factor that it
may be regarded as one of the causes of the accident. If it is sound to
say that the risk of being struck by lightning while asleep in bed is a
personal one, is it not at least equally sound that the risk of being
struck by lightning while at work be treated as a risk of the employment? And is it not as equitable for the employer to bear the cost in
the latter case as for the public to suffer in the former? Application of
the positional risk doctrine to neutral risk situations is both sensible
and fair.
The recommended approach would supply a uniformity now lacking. Courts have always had difficulty interpreting the phase "arising
out of." Decisions too often seem arbitrary and unjustified. There is
no sufficient reason for distinguishing among injuries from lightning,
stray bullets, violent lunatics and other causes which are neutral under
the proposed definition. It is simply not worth the effort and confusion.
Perhaps the strongest argument rests on clarity and ease of application. The positional risk doctrine is simple and readily intelligible,
and its application to neutral risk situations is not difficult. If the
question is sometimes shifted to whether or not a particular occurrence is a neutral one, and to whether or not an employee was in the
course of employment, then the problem is at least seen from the per26 Ky. REV. STAT.
27 Ky. Rv. STAT.
28

ch. 342 (1962).
ch. 342, § 42.004 (1950).

Adams v. Bryant, 274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955); Segal, An Historical Analysis of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Law, 47 Ky. L.J. 279, 282 (1959).
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spective from which it may most easily be solved; attention is focused
directly on the character of the incident which produced the harm.
In conclusion, courts are continuously pressed to reshape, to update, and generally to improve the law. The Corken opinion reinforces
this pressure and issues a forward invitation for fresh thinking in a
heretofore troublesome area. Whatever the details of future Court of
Appeals decisions, the invitation, the challenge, must be accepted.
James T. Waitman

